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As he walks home one evening, the victim is grabbed off the street by
a group of masked men and shoved into a waiting car. He is then driven
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to a nearby airport, where he is subjected to a process known as the
"twenty minute takeout."' During this time, the victim is photographed,
blindfolded, hooded, and shackled. His clothes are cut from him, and he
is subjected to a full-body cavity search. The victim is then forcefully
tranquilized and dressed in a diaper and either overalls or a loose
jumpsuit. To complete his transformation into a state of "almost total
immobility and sensory deprivation,"2 the victim is then strapped to a
stretcher, mattress, or chair that totally restricts his movement. He is
boarded onto a waiting plane, which later transports him to a top-secret
detention facility in another country where the laws on torture are
significantly relaxed. For days, weeks, or even months, the victim is
subjected to brutal methods of interrogational torture where he is cut,
burned, and beaten.
This man is a victim of the American-led extraordinary rendition
program, under which the United States [U.S.] government supervised
the extrajudicial transfer and interrogational torture of terrorism suspects
during the early years of the War on Terror. Although this rendition
program has come under intense public scrutiny in recent years, "'not a
single victim of the Bush administration's torture program has had his day
in a US [sic] court [to date]'."3 This is largely due to the government's
"'misuse[] [of] the 'state secrets' privilege to deny justice to torture
victims'."' However, the debate regarding liability has recently been
renewed through a series of domestic court cases examining the role of
private airline companies in the rendition program.
These airline companies were hired by the government to arrange and
execute the transport of suspects from one country to another. Although
these companies have yet to be held liable for their roles in the rendition
program, the U.S. legal system provides a basis for such liability via the
principles of corporate complicity, which impose criminal liability upon
companies that were complicit in the violation of an individual's human
rights. The Alien Tort Statute [ATS] similarly provides civil remedies to
foreign nationals who were injured in violation of domestic law.
I Complaint at 13, Mohamed v. Jeppesen Dataplan, Inc., 539 F. Supp. 2d 1128 (N.D. 2007)
(No. 5:07-CV-02798).
2 Id.
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Although the state secrets and political question doctrines are certainly
valid principles under domestic law, they simply do not override
corporate responsibility in cases of extraordinary rendition. As such, the
courts overseeing these cases have an entirely valid legal basis for
imposing liability upon the private airlines that executed renditions during
the War on Terror.
II. U.S. EXTRAORDINARY RENDITION PROGRAM
Rendition is not a new concept in American legal history. As first
used, the term referenced the abduction and transfer of foreign nationals
to the U.S. or their country of origin to face trial for their alleged crimes.5
However, given the extraordinary and extrajudicial nature of the act, the
rendition process has evolved into something entirely different in recent
years, coming to be known as "extraordinary rendition." This change was
largely spurred by the events of September 11 2001 ("9/11"), "when 'the
gloves came off,' [and] the phenomenon [of rendition] exploded. As
Cofer Black, onetime director of the CIA's counterterrorist unit, put it:
'There was a before-9/11 and an after-9/11'." 6 As a result, the once lawful
process of rendition has since transformed into that which is "meant to
evade any semblance of [a] lawful process. "'
A. The History of Rendition in the U.S.
The modem concept of rendition was shaped by the Reagan
administration in the 1980s. During the earlier half of the decade,
President Ronald Reagan and his staff largely refused to utilize rendition
5 This refers to a specific category of rendition known as "extradition." See David Weissbrodt &
Amy Bergquist, Etraordinary Rendition and the Torture Connion, 46 VA. J. INT'L L 585, 586-87 (2006)
("Criminals have historically crossed boundaries in an effort to escape the reach of law enforcement In
response, governments have pursued extradition policies whereby a person who is charged with a crime in one
jurisdiction may be brought to justice with the aid of the jurisdiction where the accused is found... There
were two categories of renditions: (1) renditions in which agents of the state where the person was present
seized the individual and surrendered him or her to agents of another state without using formal or legal
processes and (2) renditions in'which other persons conducted the seizure with or without the awareness or
approval of that state.").
6 AlanW. Clarke, Rendiion to Torture:A Critia Legal History, 62 RUTGERS L. REV. 1,22(2009) (citing
Peter Popham and Jerome Taylor, The War on Terror Inside the Dark Wold of Rendition, THE INDEP., (June 8,
2007), httpV/Avww.independent.co.uk/newworld/politics/the-war-on-terror-inside-the-dark-world-of-
rendition-452261.htinl).
7 Id. at 5.
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as a tool for combating terrorism.' However, a series of attacks between
1984 and 1986 compelled President Reagan to reevaluate his
counterterrorism strategies. In 1986 the President signed a covert
directive authorizing the Central Intelligence Agency [CIA] to kidnap
terrorism suspects located on foreign soil.9 The first such initiative was
known as "Operation Goldenrod," a joint operation between the CIA and
Federal Bureau of Investigation [FBI] in 1987.10 Operation Goldenrod
targeted Fawaz Yunis, an alleged terrorist leader who was wanted for his
role in hijacking a Jordanian airplane with American citizens onboard."
Agents tracked Yunis to Cyprus, where he was lured into international
waters with promises of a drug deal, arrested, and later brought to the
U.S. for trial. 2
The rendition process garnered significant support in the years
following Operation Goldenrod. Although primarily intended by the
Reagan administration as a tool for combating terrorism, the practice of
rendition was slowly "expanded to include garden varieties of serious
crimes"13 as well. President George H.W. Bush further legitimized the
practice by drafting the first official guidelines for rendition in 1992.14
This did little to assuage the fears of incoming President Bill Clinton,
who expressed his hesitation over the legality of the expanded practice in
1993.15 However, President Clinton allegedly fell victim to the
misguidance of Vice President Al Gore, who laughed-off the President's
concerns, saying something to the effect of: "That's a no-brainer. Of
course it's a violation of international law, that's why it's a covert action.
The guy is a terrorist. Go grab his ass."' 6
With that President Clinton was seemingly swayed in favor of
rendition, and the process grew considerably under his administration. In
1995, Clinton issued Presidential Decision Directive 39, which held that:





12 Clarke, supra note 6, at 12-13.
13 Id. at 16.
14 National Security Directive No. 77 (Jan. 1992) (remains classified). See Fed'n of Am.
Scientists, National Security Directives (NSD) [Bush Administration 1989-1993], available at
http://www.fas.org/irp/offdocs/nsd/index.html (confirming classified status of NSD-77).
15 RicHARDA CLARKE, AGAINST ALL ENEMiES: INSIDE AMERICA'S WAR ON TERROR 143-44 (Free
Press 2004).
16 Id.
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We shall vigorously apply extraterritorial statutes to counter acts of
terrorism and apprehend terrorists outside of the United States.
When terrorists wanted for violation of U.S. law are at large
overseas, their return for prosecution shall be a matter of the
highest priority and shall be a continuing central issue in bilateral
relations with any state that harbors or assists them. Where we do
not have adequate arrangements, the Departments of State and
Justice shall work to resolve the problem, where possible and
appropriate, through negotiation and conclusion of new
extradition treaties. If we do not receive adequate cooperation
from a state that harbors a terrorist whose extradition we are
seeking, we shall take appropriate measures to induce cooperation.
Return of suspects by force may be effected without the
cooperation of the host government.
17
According to former CIA counterterrorism expert Michael Scheuer,
rendition became a particularly critical tool in the Clinton
administration's fight against militant Islamic groups such as al Qaeda.
Scheuer helped establish the rendition program in part because, "'[w]e
knew where these people were, but we couldn't capture them because we
had nowhere to take them.' The agency realized that 'we had to come up
with a third party'."" The U.S. then began soliciting international
support for the practice by engaging such countries as Egypt, Morocco,
Syria, and Jordan, "all of which [had] been cited for human-rights
violations by the State Department, and [were] known to torture
suspects." 9 Once U.S. forces captured a suspect, he was to be transferred
to detainment facilities in these third-party states.
It was thus under the Clinton administration that the rendition
program "morphed from one in which the U.S. government used formal
proceedings to try the covertly abducted to a program where the suspects
are transferred to countries where it is likely-if not a near-certain
probability-they will be tortured."" This shift marked the beginning of
17 Presidential Decision Directive No. 39 (June 21, 1995), available at httpV/www.fas.org/
irp/offdocs/pdd39.htn.
18 Jane Mayer, Outsourcing Torture: The Secret Htory ofAmerca 's "Extraordinary Rendition" Program, NEW
YORKER, Feb. 14, 2005, available at htpV//www.newyorker.com/archive 05i0/14/050214fa_ &ct6?current
Page=all.
19 Id.
20 Jamie A. Baron Rodriguez, Torture on Trial: How the Alien Tort Statute May Expos die United States
Government's llgal "Extraordinary Rendition" Program Through Its Use of a Private Contractor, 14 ILSAJ. INT'L &
COMP. L. 189, 197 (2007).
2o011]
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the extraordinary rendition program, which targeted a small number of
suspects to be "removed from foreign states and transported to other
foreign states where they were wanted for trial or detention without
affording such suspects the opportunity to contest their removal."5
Although a suspect's civil liberties were largely disregarded during this
process, renditions were still subject to several procedural safeguards at
that time. As such, the rendition of a suspect could not be approved
without the existence of
[an] 'outstanding legal process' against the suspect (usually
consisting of a conviction connected to terrorist-related offenses
in a foreign state); a CIA profile; review and approval by senior
government officials, including the CIA's legal counsel; the
existence of states willing to assist in the apprehension and
incarceration of the suspect; and diplomatic assurances that the
suspect would be treated in accordance with applicable national
laws.22
The U.S. and its allies used these limitations to justify its actions under
domestic and international law.' With a growing network of global
support, the U.S. rendered some 70 suspects to foreign jurisdictions
before the attacks of 9/1 1.24
B. Extraordinary Rendition in the War on Terror
Although the U.S. had long been moving in this direction, it was the
attacks of 9/11 that compelled the government to fully implement the
extraordinary rendition program. The attacks provided the "Bush
Administration [with] a broad mandate from a frightened American
public 'to bring [the] terrorists to justice' 25 by whatever means possible.
In the name of counterterrorism and using the public's fear to justify its
21 Lucien J. Dhooge, The State Secrets Privilege and Corporate Compliity in Extraordinary Rendition, 37 GA
J. INT'L&COMP. L. 469,473 (2009).
22 Id. at 472 (referencing Eur. Pan. Ass'n, Alleged Secret Detentions and Unlawful Inter-State Transfers of
Detainees Involing Council ofEuropeMember States, 57th Sess., Doc. No. 10957, 26 (2006)).
23 Id.
24 Lucien Dhooge, The Political Question Doctrine and Corporate Complicity in Extraordinary Rendition, 21
TEMP. INT'L& COMP. L.J. 311,315 (2007).
25 Clarke, supra note 6, at 26 (citing George W. Bush, U.S. President, State of the Union Address
(Jan. 20, 2002), available at http//fr-webgate.access.gpo.gov/cgi-bi/getdoc.cgi?dbname=2001_presidentia_
documents&dodd=pd29ja0ltxt-2.pd).
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actions, the government instructed the CIA to establish "'secret detention
facilities outside the United States, and to question those held in them
with unprecedented harshness'."26  Suspects were abducted and
transferred to facilities in territories such as Afghanistan, Egypt,
Guantanamo, Iraq, Jordan, Morocco, Pakistan, Poland, Syria, Romania,
Thailand, and Uzbekistan, "allegedly for the purpose of subjecting such
individuals to detention and interrogation methods that did not comport
with U.S. law or international standards."27 Thus the extraordinary
rendition program existed to execute the forcible, extrajudicial kidnapping
and transfer of suspects to secret detention facilities in third-party states,
where the suspect was subjected to torture, indefinite detention, and
effectively denied the "due process protections afford [ed] by U.S. law."
28
This denial of due process was apparent at every stage of an
extraordinary rendition:
[E]ach [victim was] stripped, shackled, and flown blindfolded to
secret detention facilities across the globe, against their will, where
they were physically and psychologically tortured devoid of
judicial safeguards. None would know their seizures and secret
detentions were part of a larger clandestine CIA secret rendition
program, in which suspected terrorists are methodically plucked
from neighboring nations, and placed against their will to "black
sites" across the globe to countries it is more likely than not that
the transfer will lead to their torture. They would each instantly
become "ghost detainees" and [suffer) prolonged periods without
charge .... 29
Not only were rendition victims denied the most basic of their due
process rights during this process, but often no justification for rendering
suspects was given. In 2005 the CIA Inspector General was forced to
investigate the program after receiving evidence of several "erroneous
renditions" where the CIA "'picked up the wrong people[] who had no
26 Id., citing Barry et al, The Roots of Torture, NEvsWEE, May 24, 2004, available at
httpVAww.newsweecom20405/23/the-roots-of-torture.htnl.
27 Dhooge, supra note 21, at 473.
28 Dhooge, supra note 24, at 314.
29 Baron Rodriguez, supra note 20, at 190 (citing WORLD ORG. FOR HUM. RTS. USA, TORTURE,
ARBITRARY DETENTION, AND OTHER MAJOR HUMAN RIGHTS ABUSES BY THE UNrED STATES: U.S.
NONCOMPLIANCE WITH THE INTERNATIONAL COVENANT ON CIVIL AND POLITICAL RIGHTS IN THE
CONTEXT OF THE "WAR ON TERROR" (February 2006), available at httpV/www2.ohchr.org/engish/
bodies/hrddocs/ngoswofir.pd).
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information'."3" Because these so-called "ghost detainees" were kept off
of prison rosters and never presented to the International Committee of
the Red Cross,3 it is incredibly difficult to track how many individuals
were subjected to the extraordinary rendition program. However, recent
estimates suggest that President Bush's "aggressive policy expanded the
rendition process [by] sending hundreds, or by some estimates, thousands
of people into a legal no-man's land."32
Despite the covert nature of this program, extraordinary rendition
eventually came to be known as "one of the biggest nonsecrets in
Washington."33 As more information was leaked to the public, U.S.
officials tried to justify the program by explaining that, "[w]e don't kick
the [expletive] out of them. We send them to other countries so they can
kick the [expletive] out of them."34 This did little to quiet their critics,
who referred to extraordinary rendition as nothing more than "torture by
proxy[,]"3 S thus allowing the U.S. to "outsource [its] torture. ,36
Nevertheless, the extraordinary rendition program was not abolished until
President Barack Obama assumed office in January 2009.3v
C. Extending Justice to Victims of Extraordinary Rendition
Academic Lucien Dhooge acknowledges that "[e]ven the staunchest
supporter of the Bush administration's antiterrorism policies must admit
that the U.S. rendition policy, as modified in the wake of September 11'
has resulted in human rights abuses." 31 Yet the perpetrators of
extraordinary rendition have gone entirely unpunished. With the
government hiding behind the state secrets and political question
doctrines, it has long seemed that victims could seek no redress for their
30 Dana Priest, Wrongfud Imprsonment. Anatomy of a CM Mistake, WASH. POST, (Dec. 4, 2005),
http/ww.washingtonpostconVwp-dyn/content/article/2005/12/03/AR2005120301476.html.
31 See HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, THE UNITED STATES' "DISAPPEARED": THE CIA's LONG-TERM
"GHOST DETAINEES" 5 ( 2004), avaiable at httpV;/ww.hrw.org/en/repor,!2004/10/12/united-stats-
disappeared-cias-long-term-ghost-detainees.
32 Clarke, supra note 6, at 26.
33 Editorial, Torture by Proxy, N.Y. TIMES, March 8, 2005, httpV/www.nytimes.com/
2005/03i0 8/opinion/08tuel.hmIA.
34 Dana Priest& Barton Gellman, US. D Abuse but Defends Interrgaions, WASH. POST, Dec. 26,
2002, http/www.washingtonpostcongwp-dyn/content/aricle-20066(09/AR2006060 9 01356 .html (emphasis
added).
35 Torture by Proxy, supra note 33.
36 Clarke, supra note 6, at 6.
37 Exec. Order 13,491, 74 Fed. Reg. 4,893, 4,894 (Jan. 22, 2009).
38 Dhooge, supra note 24, at 344.
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suffering. However, those possessing this belief failed to consider the full
scope of the extraordinary rendition program. For though the U.S.
government was largely responsible for the execution of extraordinary
renditions, it was not the only party responsible.
Indeed, a series of recent court cases has examined the liability of
secondary parties to extrajudicial transfers. Specifically, these cases have
examined the liability of the private airline companies that were hired by
the U.S. government to execute the transport of individuals from one
country to another. Although these companies were not responsible for
the creation or supervision of the extraordinary rendition program, they
certainly enabled its nearly decade-long success. As such, these companies
not only provided for the physical transportation of suspects, but also
arranged for various pre- and post-flight logistical details including flight
itineraries and on-the-ground security measures.
Although the courts have yet to assign liability to these private airline
companies, there is certainly a basis for doing so. This basis is particularly
grounded in theories of corporate social responsibility. Though the
parameters of this field are still evolving, "there are growing expectations
that corporations should do everything in their power to promote
universal human rights standards."39 When companies fail to abide by this
duty and promote the violation of human rights in the performance of
their professional duties, they should be held responsible for breaching
their corporate social responsibilities.
Ill. CORPORATE COMPLICITY
One theory of corporate social responsibility is that of corporate
complicity, which refers to the "alleged knowing involvement of
corporations in human rights abuses committed by others."4° Under this
theory, allegations of corporate complicity do not hold the corporation
responsible as the principal offender of a human rights abuse. Instead, the
corporation is responsible for providing support to those who committed
the abuses, "either by encouraging them and/or by providing some form
of assistance."'" The term stems from traditional notions of complicity,
39 Andrew Clapham & Scott Jerbi, Categories of Corporate Complicity in Human Righs Abuses, 24
HASTINGS INT'L&COMP. L. REv. 339,339 (2001).
40 Jonathan Clough, Punishing the Parent: Corporate Criminal Complicity in Human Rights Abuses, 33
BROOKJ. INT'L L 899, 901 (2008).
41 Id. at 905.
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which are widely recognized as providing a basis for criminal liability
under domestic and international law.
42
Academic Jonathan Clough has isolated the four key features of a
corporate complicity case:
1. The defendant is a large, well-resourced transnational
corporation.
2. The alleged human rights abuses occurred in a country (the
'host jurisdiction') other than the transnational corporation's
country of incorporation (the 'home jurisdiction').
3. The host jurisdiction is unable and/or unwilling to investigate
and prosecute the alleged abuses.
4. The transnational corporation is alleged to be complicit in the
human rights abuses either directly or, more commonly,
indirectly through the interposition of subsidiaries or other
intermediaries .... 43
Corporations are thus viewed as accomplices to be punished for their
"knowing involvement in the crime of another."' The theories of
corporate complicity extend to varying levels of corporate involvement in
the abuses, yet all are still punishable.
A. Categories of Corporate Complicity
The concept of corporate complicity can be divided into three
categories: direct, indirect, and silent complicity.45 A corporation is liable
for direct complicity when "it decides to participate through assistance in
the commission of human rights abuses and that assistance contributes to
the commission of the human rights abuses by another."46  Direct
complicity "requires intentional participation,"47 where the corporation
did not intend to cause harm but did possess knowledge of the foreseeable
harmful effects of the principal offender's actions." In asserting direct
complicity, "the primary perpetrator does not necessarily have to have
42 Id. (noting criminal complicity is "almost universally recognized as a legitimate basis for criminal
liability.").
43 Id. at 901-02.
44 Id. at 905.
45 Clapham &Jerbi, supra note 39, at 341-42.
46 Id. at 346.
47 Id. at 342.
48 Id.
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been found responsible in order for the corporate accomplice to be found
liable for having contributed to those same human rights abuses." 9
However, asserting liability for corporate complicity does not always
require such direct involvement on behalf of the corporation. "Indirect
corporate complicity," also commonly referred to as "beneficial corporate
complicity," "describe[s] the corporate position vis-1-vis government
violations when the business benefits from human rights abuses committed
by someone else.""0 This theory of liability stems from the desire to force
businesses to "'be discerning in identifying their indirect connection to
violations'."5 As such, a corporation is responsible for indirect complicity
when human rights abuses occur in the context of its business operations,
regardless of whether the corporation itself was the direct cause of the
harm.
The final theory of complicity is not based on the action of a
corporation but on its inaction instead. Silent complicity may be asserted
against a corporation that fails to "raise systematic or continuous human
rights abuses with the appropriate authorities." 2 This theory reflects the
notion that "'[s]ilence or inaction will be seen to provide comfort to
oppression and may be adjudged complicity ... silence is not neutrality.
To do nothing is not an option'." 3  Consequently, corporations
increasingly confront positive obligations to prevent complicity and to
promote human rights in the regions in which they work.
B. Elements of Corporate Complicity
The above theories are of such importance to the international
community that, to date, multiple instruments for policing corporate
complicity have arisen. 4 However, both foreign and domestic legal
systems have struggled to define the scope of liability in such cases. As it
stands, the only globally acknowledged elements for a showing of
49 Id. at 346.
so Id. (emphasis added).
51 Clapham & Jerbi, supra note 39, at 346 (quoting MARGARET JUNGK, DANISH CENTRE FOR
HUMAN RIGHTS, HUMAN RIGHTS & Bus. PROJEcT, DEFINING THE SCOPE OF BUSINESS RESPONSBmLET
FOR HUMAN RIGHTS ABROAD 11 (Jan. 20,2005), httpVAvww.humanrightsbusiness.org/file'320569722/file/
definine_thescope..of_bnessrponsibiiy_.pd).
52 Id. at 348.
53 Id. (quoting CHRISTOPHER L. AVERY, BUSINESS AND HUMAN RIGHTS IN A TIME OF CHANGE
(1999), available at http,//198.170.85.29/Chapter2.htm).
54 These include voluntary instrmments, civil actions against corporations, and statutory regulations
of complicity.
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complicity are: (1) a principal offender (other than the complicit
corporation); (2) the actus reus of the corporation in knowingly assisting a
human rights violation; and (3) the mens rea of the corporation in
intending to assist the commission of the principal offense."5
With regards to the first factor, it has been determined that "liability
for complicity is derivative."56 As such, liability for complicity relies first
on the commission of a principal offense by a principal offender. The
accused corporation is then liable for its role as a secondary party to this
principal offense. Thus, for liability to be imposed, a court must be
convinced that the principal offense did take place. However, it is not
necessary that the principal offender has also been convicted of the
principal offense: "So long as the trier of fact is satisfied that the principal
offense was committed by some person, and is satisfied of the accused's
involvement in that offense, then [the corporation] may be liable as an
accessory." 7
A court must also be convinced that the corporate actor possessed the
necessary actus reus, that the corporation "'is in some way linked in
purpose with the person actually committing the crime, and is by [its]
words or conduct doing something to bring about, or rendering more
likely, such commission'. " "8 This may be proven through evidence that
the corporation knowingly provided assistance or encouragement to the
principal offender, or failed to intervene and prevent the principal offense.
Although efforts to further define this element have largely failed, it has
consistently been noted that evidence of a corporation's aiding, 9
counseling,' or procuring61 would be sufficient to establish the actus reus
of complicity. However, "mere acquiescence in or assent to the principal
offense is not sufficient to constitute complicity."62 Instead, a more active
showing of support is needed.
55 Seegenerally Clough, supra note 40, at 906-13.
56 Id. at 906.
S7 Id.
58 Id. at 907-08 (citing R v Runs)) [1933] VR 59, 67 (Austl.)).
59 "Aiding" is defined as the provision of help, support, or assistance to a principal offender. Typical
acts of aiding include the provision of materials or other physical support. See id. at 908.
60 "Counseling" involves advice or encouragement prior to the commission of the offense. Id.
61 "Procuring" suggests the accused went beyond mere encouragement of the commission of the
principal offense and actually caused its commission. This is the only form of complicity requiring proofofa
causal connection between the corporation's conduct and the commission of the principal offense. Clough,
supra note 40, at 909.
62 Id. at 910.
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Finally, a court must be convinced as to the mens rea of a corporation
in its "inten[tion] to assist or encourage the commission of the principal
offense."' This requires proof that the corporation knew of the principal
offender's intent to commit a crime, and proof that the crime was actually
committed.64 This does not, however, require proof that the corporation
and principal offender shared a common purpose; a corporation is still
liable for complicity if its actions were motivated by nothing more than its
business interests. Rather, a shared intent exists where the principal
offense was either a possible,65 or natural and probable,' consequence of
the corporation's encouragement or support.67
Efforts to impose liability for corporate complicity raise a particularly
complex question when applied to parent companies and their
subsidiaries. Although there is little information available on the matter,
what research does exist suggests that "[blecause of the principle of
separate corporate identity, the subsidiary or related company is treated as
a separate legal entity."68 Accordingly, a parent company is not commonly
held liable for the conduct of its subsidiary. The theories of limited
liability similarly strengthen the distinction between parent and
subsidiary, so that "in the multi-tiered corporate group, with its first-tier,
second-tier, and even third-tier subsidiaries, traditional entity law
provides multiple layers of limited liability, with each upper-tier company
insulated from liability for its lower-tier subsidiaries."69 However, courts
are not prohibited from regarding a group of companies as an integrated
entity, and will look to the context of the case in making this
determination; here "[r]elevant factors include the level of control
actually exercised by the parent over the subsidiary, the extent to which
the companies are economically integrated, the level of financial and
administrative interdependence, overlapping employment structures, and
a common group persona."70
63 Id. at 910-11.
64 Id. at 911 ("It is sufficient that the accused has knowledge of the principal offender's intention to
commit a crime of the type that was in fact committed.").
65 Id. at 913 ("In some jurisdictions, the level of foresight required is low, requiring only that the
defendant foresaw the offense actually committed was aposible consequence of thejoint enterprise.").
66 Id. ("In other[] [urisdictions], such as the United States, the acts of the principal offender must
have been a 'natural and probable consequence' of the criminal scheme the accomplice encouraged or aided.").
67 Clough, supra note 40, at 913.
68 Id. at 915.
69 Id. at 916.
70 Id. at 917.
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Thus, the principles of complicity place a significant burden on
corporations to "'support and respect the protection of international
human rights within their spheres of influence'" and to ensure that "'their
own corporations [are] not complicit in human rights abuses'."7' In
recent years corporations have come to be regarded as fundamental organs
of society with a moral and social responsibility to respect universal
human rights. Even if a corporation is not the principal offender in a
human rights abuse, its role as a secondary complicit party is often
sufficient for extending liability.
IV. ALIEN TORT STATUTE
The theories of complicity are central to the field of corporate social
responsibility. Yet, while these theories certainly help to identify when a
corporation has breached its duty to respect human rights, they fail to
provide a vehicle by which victims can hold these companies liable. That
is not to say that such a vehicle does not exist.
The Alien Tort Statute [ATS]72 was adopted through the Judiciary Act
of 1789,73 and was intended as "a basis for providing a civil remedy to the
victims of the enemies of mankind." 74 Although this statute is not in itself
a cause of action, it allows foreign nationals to bring suit in domestic
courts for two types of alleged violations: (1) violations of those human
rights embodied in the laws of nations; and (2) violations of U.S.-ratified
treaties committed while abroad. The current language of the ATS reads:
"The district courts shall have original jurisdiction of any civil action by
an alien for a tort only, committed in violation of the law of nations or a
treaty of the United States. " T
As first enacted, the statute was "intended [only] to give federal courts
jurisdiction to hear common law tort suits for the 1 8 ' century law of
nations paradigms of 'violation of safe conducts, infringement of the
rights of ambassadors, and piracy'." 76 However, the scope of the ATS has
evolved with time, and now "recognizes as federal common law those
71 Clapham & Jerbi, supra note 39, at 341 (quoting The Ten Principles, UNITED NATIONS GLOBAL
COMPACT, httplAvww.unglobalcompactorg/AboutTheGC/TheTenPrinciples/mdexhtml (last visited Mar.
24, 2011) (internal quotation marks omitted)).
72 Alien Tort Statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1350 (1948) [hereinafter ATS].
73 JudiciaryAct of 1789, ch. 20, S9, 1 Stat 73, 77 (1789).
74 Baron Rodriguez, supra note 20, at 193.
75 ATS, supra note 72.
76 Doug Cassel, CotprateAiding andAbetting of Human Rights Vioaons: Confsion in the Courts, 6 Nw.J.
INT'L HUM. RTs. 304,318 (2008) (citing Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692,724-25 (2004)).
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international norms that have definite content and acceptance among
civilized nations."' More specifically, the claim must be founded on "a
norm of international character accepted by the civilized world and
defined with a specificity comparable to the features of the 18'-century
paradigms.""8 Accordingly, contemporary customary norms-such as the
prohibition of genocide, war crimes, crimes against humanity and
torture-have sufficiently widespread global acceptance and definitional
specificity as to constitute torts under the ATS.
There exists some controversy as to whether the ATS extends to cases
of indirect liability or cases involving corporations. Although domestic
courts have provided little guidance on this matter, what evidence does
exist suggests that the ATS is applicable. In 2005, the Eleventh Circuit
Court of Appeals held that the ATS is "not limited to claims of direct
liability. "7  As a result, cases alleging corporate complicity might fall
under the purview of the ATS. However, courts have placed some
restrictions on these cases: "In cases against private actors, such as
corporations... courts must ... consider whether the norm extends not
merely to states, but also to private actors."' These assertions reveal a fine
distinction, as corporations cannot be sued for violating norms that apply
only to states, while the courts have not yet definitively determined
"whether a corporation can aid and abet a violation committed by state
actors."8s
V. THE STATE SECRETS AND POLITICAL QUESTION DOCTRINES
Two legal doctrines pose significant challenges to extraordinary
rendition cases: the state secrets and political question doctrines. Both
limit the power of domestic courts to examine particular categories of
information. First, the state secrets doctrine prohibits courts from
examining evidence that might endanger national security. Second, the
political question doctrine prohibits courts from reviewing decisions that
are constitutionally designated to a separate governmental branch. Given
the sensitive nature of the extraordinary rendition program and its
supervision by the Executive branch, these two doctrines appear to be
7 Baron Rodriguez, supra note 20, at 192-93.
78 Sosa, 542 U.S. at 724-25.
79 Cabello v. Femandez-Larios, 402 F.3d 1148,1157 (1lth Cir. 2005).
80 Cassel, supra note 76.
81 Id. at 319 (emphasis added).
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those most commonly cited by parties seeking to quash claims against
private corporations.
A. The State Secrets Doctrine
The state secrets doctrine has long been established in U.S. legal
history, having first been explored during the treason trial of Aaron Burr
in 1807.82 Since then, the privilege has developed to serve as a "'common
law evidentiary rule that protects information from discovery when
disclosure would be inimical to the national security'."83 The doctrine
derives from the "'President's constitutional authority over the conduct of
[the] country's diplomatic and military affairs'."84  As a result the
government may claim the privilege to protect the disclosure of
information that could impair national security capabilities, disclose
methods of intelligence gathering, or impede diplomatic relations with
foreign governments."
Once the state secrets privilege has been asserted, the court must
engage in a two-part analysis to determine its applicability to the case at
hand. First, the court must determine if the privilege has been properly
invoked and can be sufficiently established. If the court answers
affirmatively, the state secrets privilege will remain absolute and the
protected information may not be revealed.86 The court must then
consider the impact of barring the evidence on the overall litigation. In
doing so, the court will "determin[e] the centrality of the privileged
material to the claims."87 If the state secrets form the "very subject
matter "" of the proceedings, the case will be dismissed.
The majority of cases dealing with the state secrets privilege address
the first prong of a court's analysis, and attempt to set a standard for when
the privilege may be properly established. The "doctrine today is marked
82 Michael P. Jensen, Torture and Public Policy: Mohamed v. Jeppesen Dataplan, Inc. Alows
"Extraordinary Rendition" Victims to LitigateAround State SecretsDoctrne, 2010 BYUL. REV. 117,122 (2010).
V Dhooge, supra note 21, at 485-86 (citing Heptingv. AT&T Corp., 439 F. Supp. 2d 974,980 (N.D.
Cal. 2006)).
84 Id. at 486 (citing El-Masri v. Tenet, 437 F. Supp. 2d 530,535 (E.D. Va. 2006)).
85 See id. at 486 (citing Ellsberg v. Mitchell, 709 F.2d 51, 57 (D.C. Cir. 1983)).
86 Id. at 495 ("Once determined to be secret and present a 'reasonable danger' of negative impact
upon national security and foreign relations, details of the extraordinary rendition program are protected from
disclosure without further judicial inquiry.").
87 Id. at 497.
88 Id. (citing Al-Haramain Islamic Found. v. Bush, 507 F-3d 1190, 1197 (9th Cir. 2008)).
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by 'two parallel strands' from two landmark Supreme Court cases[,] " 89
Totten v. United States90 and United States v. Reynolds.9'
1. The Totten Case
In Totten, the Supreme Court set an extreme, bright-line rule barring
the adjudication of all claims based on confidential agreements. In 1861,
William A. Lloyd was hired by President Abraham Lincoln to serve as a
spy during the Civil War.' According to their agreement, Lloyd was to be
paid $200 a month for his services, which he faithfully performed until
the conclusion of the war.93 At that time, Lloyd requested that his wages
be paid, yet he was only reimbursed for expenses incurred.94 Lloyd then
brought suit seeking to compel the government to honor its agreement
and to pay his wages.9"
The Court did not question the validity of the contract, noting only
that the President "was undoubtedly authorized during the war .. .to
employ secret agents"96 and to enter into binding agreements for their
reimbursement. Instead, the Court questioned its capacity to adjudicate
cases based on secret information. In exploring the context of the
agreement between Lloyd and the government, the Court reasoned that
the contract was for a "secret service; the information sought was to be
obtained clandestinely, and was to be communicated privately; the
employment and the service were to be equally concealed." 97 Given the
nature of the contract, the Court reasoned that both parties understood its
confidential nature and knew that they were prohibited from disclosing it
to or discussing it with others.9" Consequently, "[t]he publicity produced
by an action would itself be a breach of a contract of that kind, and thus
defeat a recovery."' Accordingly, Lloyd's claim was dismissed.
89 Jensen, supra note 82, at 22 (citing Mohamed v. Jeppesen Dataplan, Inc., 614 F.3d 1070, 1084 (9th
Cir. 2009)).
90 Totten v. United States, 92 U.S. 105 (1875).
91 United States v. Reynolds, 345 U.S. 1 (1953).
92 See Totten, 92 U.S. at 105-06.
93 See id. at 106.
94 See id.
95 See id. at 105.
96 See id. at 106.
97 Id. at 106.
98 See Totten, 92 U.S. at 106.
99 Id. at 107.
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The Court not only dismissed Lloyd's claim but also noted the
expansive nature of the precedent set by this case:
It may be stated as a general principle, that public policy forbids
the maintenance of any suit in a court ofjustice, the trial of which
would inevitably lead to the disclosure of matters which the law
itself regards as confidential, and respecting which it will not
allow the confidence to be violated. On this principle, suits cannot
be maintained which would require a disclosure of the
confidences of the confessional, or those between husband and
wife, or of communications by a client to his counsel for
professional advice, or of a patient to his physician for a similar
purpose. Much greater reason exists for the application of the
principle to cases of contract for secret services with the
government, as the existence of a contract of that kind is itself a
fact not to be disclosed."
As a result, the Totten bar applied "not just to contract actions but any case
where proof of a confidential relationship with the U.S. government is
necessary for success on the merits. " "' This directive from the Court
served as a blanket denial of jurisdiction over any case requiring the
disclosure of state secrets.
2. The Reynolds Case
The Supreme Court revisited the Totten holding in the 1953 case of
United States v. Reynolds. This case arose from an incident involving a B-29
aircraft, which had been taken out for the "purpose of testing secret
electronic equipment.",1 2  Onboard at the time were four civilian
observers and nine crewmembers.' °3 While aloft, a fire broke out in one
of the aircraft's engines, killing three of the civilians and six of the
crewmembers 4  The widows of the deceased civilians brought suit
against the government and moved for the production of the Air Force's
official accident investigation report and official statements given by the
100 Id.
101 Dhooge, supra note 21, at 505.
102 United States v. Reynolds, 345 U.S. 1, 3 (1953).
103 Se id.
104 Seeid.
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surviving crewmembers in conjunction with the investigation." 5 The
government sought to quash the motion by asserting the state secrets
privilege." 6 Although the district court ordered the production of the
documents, the government staunchly refused to comply and a judgment
was entered for the plaintiffs.' °7
The Supreme Court granted certiorari to determine whether the
privilege applied. 8 The Court noted the challenges in working with the
state secrets privilege, as the "court itself must determine whether the
circumstances are appropriate for the claim of privilege, and yet do so
without forcing a disclosure of the very thing the privilege is designed to
protect."" 9 Consequently, the Court identified the need for a balancing
test:
Judicial control over the evidence in a case cannot be abdicated to
the caprice of executive officers. Yet we will not go so far as to say
that the court may automatically require a complete disclosure to
the judge before the claim of privilege will be accepted in any
case.
110
The Totten holding was thus discarded for a new standard, where the state
secrets privilege was validly asserted only when a court was satisfied "from
all the circumstances of the case, that there is a reasonable danger that
compulsion of the evidence will expose military matters which, in the
interest of national security, should not be divulged.""'
To better define this standard, the Court conditioned a successful
state secrets claim on three elements:
First, the privilege must be asserted by the head of an executive
branch agency with control over the secrets at issue. Second, the
head of the agency must personally consider the matter prior to
assertion of the privilege. Finally, the information sought to be




107 See i. at 5.
108 Rernolds, 345 U.S.at 3.
109 Id. at 8.
110 Id. at 9-10.
III Id. at 10.
112 Dhooge, supra note 21, at 487.
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However, the information itself need not have great significance to qualify
under the state secrets privilege. Instead, courts later applying the Reynolds
standard held that "even 'seemingly innocuous information' is privileged
if that information is part of a classified 'mosaic' that 'can be analyzed and
fitted into place to reveal with startling clarity how the unseen whole must
operate'."'. 3 Thus the "'most compelling necessity cannot overcome the
claim of privilege if the court is ultimately satisfied that [state] secrets are
at stake'."
114
However, the Court maintained that the existence of a state secret did
not necessitate automatic dismissal of the case. As long as the information
protected by the privilege was not "indispensable to a prima facie case or a
valid defense,".. the case was to continue. In the Reynolds case, the Court
noted "necessity was greatly minimized by an available alternative, which
might have given respondents the evidence to make out their case without
forcing a showdown on the claim of privilege."" 6 Thus, although the
Court determined that the information in the official incident reports
constituted state secrets because there was a "reasonable danger that [they]
would contain references to the secret electronic equipment[,]"" 7 the case
was not altogether dismissed. Instead, the case was remanded to district
court upon the Court's reasoning that "[t]here is nothing to suggest that
the electronic equipment, in this case, had any causal connection with the
accident. Therefore, it should be possible for respondents to adduce the
essential facts as to causation without resort to material touching upon
military secrets.""' It is this standard that now serves as the modern bar
for successful state secrets claims.
B. The Political Question Doctrine
The political question doctrine first appeared in 1803 as part of the
Supreme Court's decision in Marbury v. Madison,"9 which stated that
"[q]uestions, in their nature political, or which are, by the constitution
and laws, submitted to the executive, can never be made in this court.
12 °
The purpose of the doctrine is to distinguish between the branches of
113 Id. at 488 (citing Ialkinv. Helms, 598 F.2d 1, 8 (D.C. Cir. 1978).
114 See generay id.
115 Jensen, supra note 82, at 125.
116 Reynds, 345 U.S. at 11.
117 Id. at 10.
118 Id. at 11.
119 Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803).
120 Id. at 170.
THE BUSINESS OF TORTURE
government and to ensure that no branch encroaches upon the decision-
making powers of another. To that end, the doctrine "excludes from
judicial review those controversies which revolve around policy choices
and value determinations constitutionally committed for resolution to the
halls of Congress or the confines of the Executive Branch."'21
The Court in Baker v. Carr'22 explored this assertion further, holding
the doctrine to be "essentially a function of the separation of powers."'
13
However, this doctrine does not expressly arise from the Constitution,
"but rather from 'pragmatic considerations based on the separation of
powers concept and [the] system of checks and balances'." 124 There is
great significance in making this distinction, "as Article III does not
prohibit courts from resolving cases posing political questions."
121
Instead, the doctrine simply limits the exercise of judicial power in such
cases.
It is the Baker case that guides modern judicial inquiries into the
application of the political question doctrine. In this case, the Supreme
Court identified six independent factors to be considered before a lawsuit
could be dismissed on the grounds of political question. In order of
descending importance, they are:
(1) "a textually demonstrable constitutional commitment of the
issue to a coordinate political department"; (2) "a lack ofjudicially
discoverable and manageable standards for resolving it"; (3) "the
impossibility of deciding without an initial policy determination
of a kind clearly for nonjudicial discretion"; (4) "the impossibility
of a court's undertaking independent resolution without
expressing lack of the respect due coordinate branches of
government"; (5) "an unusual need for unquestioning adherence
to a political decision already made"; and (6) "the potentiality of
embarrassment from multifarious pronouncements by various
departments on one question.
126
121 Japan Whaling Ass'n v. Am. Cetacean Soc'y, 478 U.S. 221,230 (1986).
122 Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186 (1962).
123 Id. at 217.
124 Dhooge, supra note 24, at 323 (quoting Atlee v. Laird, 347 F. Supp. 689, 701 (E.D. Pa. 1972)).
125 Id. at 323-24.
126 Id. at 330 (quoting Baker, 369 U.S. at 217).
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If any one of these factors is linked to a crucial issue in a case, it will be
rendered nonjusticiable. 2 7 Courts are to make this determination on a
case-by-case basis. 8
Yet the balance of justiciability is not so clear as to require the
automatic dismissal of cases involving traditionally political questions. As
acknowledged by the court in AI-Aulaqi v. Obama,'29 "[a] n examination of
the specific areas in which courts have invoked the political question
doctrine reveals that national security, military matters and foreign
relations are 'quintessential sources of political questions'.."1.0 Further,
"[i]t is not the role of judges to second-guess, with the benefit of
hindsight, another branch's determination that the interests of the United
States call for military action[,] 3"'  as these are traditionally questions
committed to the political branches. However, federal courts are not
automatically disqualified from adjudicating cases involving foreign
affairs: "The courts have adjudicated cases alleging violations of
international human rights standards and disputes arguably connected to
military operations, including combat." 3' Thus, the Baker factors provide
the only definitive guidance in determining whether the political question
doctrine applies given the context of a case.
VI. CASE STUDIES
There is certainly a considerable body of law relevant to cases of
extraordinary rendition. However, there have been surprisingly few cases
brought before domestic courts seeking to impose liability upon private
airline companies for their role in rendering victims during the War on
Terror. To date, two primary U.S. cases exist that directly touch upon
this issue: EI-Masri v. United States133 and Mohamed v. Jeppesen Dataplan,
Inc. 134
127 See Baker, 369 U.S. at 217.
128 See id. at 210-11; see aLso AI-Aulaqi v. Obama, 727 F.Supp.2d 1, 51 (D.D.C. 2010) (quoting El-
Shift Pharm. Indus. Co. v. United States, 607 F.3d 836, 841 (D.C. Cir. 2010) ("[The] political question
doctrine requires courts to engage in a fact-specific analysis of the 'particular question' posed by a specific
case.")).
129 AI-Au/aqi, 727 F.Supp.2d at 1.
130 Id. at 45 (quoting EI-Shfa, 607 F.3d at 841).
131 EI-Shifa, 607 F.3d at 844.
132 Dhooge, supra note 24, at 332.
133 El-Masri v. United States, 479 F.3d 296 (4th Cir. 2007).
134 Mohamed v.Jeppesen Dataplan, Inc., 614 F.3d 1070 (9th Cir. 2010).
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A. EI-Masri v. United States
The courts allowed the state secrets privilege to override a claim of
liability against private airline companies in the El-Masri case in 2007. In
December 2003, Khaled El-Masri, a German citizen of Lebanese
descent, 3 ' was traveling by bus in Macedonia.'36 Police removed El-Masri
from the bus at the Tabanovce border after discovering his name was
similar to that of a known 9/11 associate. 37 El-Masri was detained in a
Macedonian motel for 23 days, during which he was repeatedly
questioned about his passport, al Qaeda, and his hometown mosque.138
On that 2 3rd day,
police videotaped [El-]Masri, then bundled him, handcuffed and
blindfolded, into a van and drove to a closed-off building at the
airport... There, in silence, someone cut off his clothes. As they
changed his blindfold, "I saw seven or eight men with black
clothing and wearing masks," [he said] ... he was [then] drugged
to sleep for a long plane ride.
139
El-Masri was handed over to CIA agents, who flew him to a detention
facility near Kabul, Afghanistan."4 There he was allegedly
held against his will, but . . . also mistreated in a number of ways.
. .. including being beaten, drugged, bound, and blindfolded
during transports; confined in a small, unsanitary cell;
interrogated several times; and consistently prevented from
communicating with anyone outside the detention facility,
including his family or the German government."'
El-Masri was finally released on May 28, 2004, when he was transported
to Albania and abandoned in a remote area. 142 Albanian officials picked
him up and transported him to a local airport, from which he traveled
135 See f-Masri, 479 F.3d at 300.
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back home to Germany.143 It was later revealed that El-Masri's detention
was simply a case of mistaken identity, as the head of the CIA
Counterterrorist Center's al Qaeda unit "believed he was someone else"
144
and she "just had a hunch."
145
Pursuant to the ATS and relevant case law, El-Masri brought a civil
suit against former CIA Director George Tenet, three corporate
defendants, ten unnamed employees of the CIA, and ten unnamed
employees of the defendant corporations. 6 According to the Complaint,
the corporate defendants provided the CIA with an aircraft and
crew to transport El-Masri to Afghanistan, pursuant to an
agreement with Director Tenet, and they either knew or
reasonably should have known that "Mr. El-Masri would be
subjected to prolonged arbitrary detention, torture and cruel,
inhuman, or degrading treatment in violation of federal and
international laws during his transport to Afghanistan and while
he was detained and interrogated there."
47
The government was granted a motion to intervene based on the state
secrets privilege, and El-Masri's case was subsequently dismissed. 4 The
order was later affirmed upon review of the government's claim by the
Court of Appeals.'49
The Appeals Court meticulously applied the modern standard for a
state secrets claim, according to its three-part analysis:
At the outset, the court must ascertain that the procedural
requirements for invoking the state secrets privilege have been
satisfied. Second, the court must decide whether the information
sought to be protected qualifies as privileged under the state
secrets doctrine. Finally, if the subject information is determined
to be privileged, the ultimate question to be resolved is how the
143 See id.
144 Prie, supra note 30.
145 Id.
146 EI-Masri, 479 F.3d at 299.
147 Id. at 300 (citing Complaint at 61, EI-Masri v. Tenet, 437 F. Supp. 2d 530 (E.D. Va. 2006) (No.
1:05-CV-1417)).
148 Id. at 299-300.
149 Id. at 313.
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matter should proceed in light of the successful privilege claim.'
The court spent little time debating the first two elements. Using the
Reynolds precedent as its guide, the court first found that the procedural
requirements for invoking a state secrets claim were satisfied by the facts
of the case, as the claim had been launched by Porter Goss, then-Director
of the CIA, upon his personal review of the matter.' l
The court just as neatly found the second element to be satisfied, as
"evidence is privileged pursuant to the state secrets doctrine if, under all
the circumstances of the case, there is a reasonable danger that its
disclosure will expose military (or diplomatic or intelligence) matters
which, in the interest of national security, should not be divulged."
52
Although the Executive bears the burden of proving the reasonable danger
standard, the court revealed its almost unbridled deference to Executive
claims of state secrets: "In assessing the risk that such a disclosure might
pose to national security, a court is obliged to accord the 'utmost
deference' to the responsibilities of the executive branch."
153
It was the third element of the analysis that caused contention
amongst the litigating parties. Legal doctrine dictates that if a proceeding
involving state secrets can be fairly litigated without resorting to exposure
of the privileged information, then it may continue; yet, if the
circumstances are such that the sensitive information is so central to the
subject matter of the litigation that any effort to proceed threatens its
disclosure, then dismissal is the proper remedy." In making this analysis,
the "central facts" and "very subject matter" of an action are "those facts
that are essential to prosecuting the action or defending against it." 5 The
court found that the privilege applied to the instant case because El-Masri
was unable to establish a prima facie case under the ATS without
implicating state secrets:
To establish a prima facie case, he would be obliged to produce
admissible evidence not only that he was detained and
interrogated, but that the defendants were involved in his
detention and interrogation in a manner that renders them
150 Id. at 304.
151 See id. at 301.
152 EI-Masri, 479 F.3d at 307-08.
153 Id. at 305 (citing United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 710 (1974)).
154 Id. at 306 (citing Sterling v. Tenet, 416 F.3d 338, 348 (4th Cir. 2005)).
155 Id. at 308.
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personally liable to him. Such a showing could be made only
with evidence that exposes how the CIA organizes, staffs, and
supervises its most sensitive intelligence operations.'56
The court also noted that the government was unable to pursue valid
defenses without disclosing the means and methods by which the CIA
gathered intelligence.157
El-Masri refuted this argument, arguing that his case could be
established solely on information contained in public records relating to
his rendition.' As that information was already so widely accessible, El-
Masri contended that the state secrets privilege could not prevent its entry
as evidence.15 9 The court disagreed, maintaining that the information
available to the public did not include facts that were central to litigating
his claim." Instead, those central facts forming the subject matter of El-
Masri's claim, including the CIA's means and methods, retained their
state secret status.161 Though the court noted that the state secrets
privilege applied only to a narrow category of information, it ultimately
held that "the matter before us falls squarely within that narrow class."'62
B. Mohamed v.Jeppesen Dataplan, Inc.
The courts applied a similar analysis in the Jeppesen case. The
plaintiffs injeppesen cast a slightly smaller net "by not taking direct aim at
the state"" 6 and instead pursuing a case exclusively against the private
airline company responsible for their transport under the extraordinary
rendition program. The case was brought by five plaintiffs: Binyam
Mohamed, Abou Elkassim Britel, Ahmed Agiza, Mohamed Farag Ahmad
Bashmilah, and Bisher A1-Rawi, 16 all of whom were detained, forcibly
transferred to black sites in different countries, and subjected to brutal
methods of physical and psychological torture. 6' While Agiza and Britel
were ultimately sentenced to fifteen years in Egyptian and Moroccan
156 Id. at 309.
157 Id.




162 Id. at 313.
163 Baron Rodriguez, supra note 20, at 203.
164 Mohamed v. Jeppesen Dataplan, Inc., 614 F.3d 1070, 1074-75 (9th Cir. 2010).
165 Id.
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prisons respectively, Mohamed, Bashmilah, and Al-Rawi have since been
released.' 66
The plaintiffs argued that publicly available information established
the critical role of defendant Jeppesen Dataplan, Inc. [Jeppesen], a U.S.
corporation and subsidiary of the Boeing Company,67 in providing flight
planning and logistical support services to the aircraft and crew for all five
of their renditions. Their complaint further alleged that
"Jeppesen played an integral role in the forced" abductions and
detentions and "provided direct and substantial services to the
United States for its so-called 'extraordinary rendition' program,"
thereby "enabling the clandestine and forcible transportation of
terrorism suspects to secret overseas detention facilities." It also
alleges that Jeppesen provided this assistance with actual or
constructive "knowledge of the objectives of the rendition
program," including knowledge that the plaintiffs "would be
subjected to forced disappearance, detention, and torture" by U.S.
and foreign government officials. 68
The plaintiffs brought suit under the ATS, alleging seven theories of
liability positioned under two claims. Under the first claim of forced
disappearance, the plaintiffs alleged four theories of liability:
(1) [D]irect liability for active participation, (2) conspiracy with
agents of the United States, (3) aiding and abetting agents of the
United States and (4) direct liability "because [Jeppesen]
demonstrated a reckless disregard as to whether Plaintiffs would
be subjected to forced disappearance through its participation in
the extraordinary rendition program and specifically its provision
of flight and logistical support services and crew that it knew or
reasonably should have known would be used to transport them
to secret detention and interrogation."
169
The plaintiffs filed three other claims of liability founded in their alleged
torture and cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment: (1) conspiracy with
166 Id.
167 Baron Rodriguez, supra note 20, at 191.
168 Jeppesen Dataplan, Inc., 614 F.3d at 1075.
169 Id. at 1075-76 (citing Complaint at 254-57, Mohamed v. Jeppesen Dataplan, Inc., 539 F. Supp. 2d
1128 (N.D. Cal. 2008) (No. C07-02798JW)).
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U.S. agents in torturing and degrading the plaintiffs; (2) aiding and
abetting U.S. agents in their torture and degrading treatment; and (3)
reckless disregard as to whether plaintiffs would be subjected to torture or
other such treatment, by providing flight and logistical support that it
knew or reasonably should have known would be used as part of the
extraordinary rendition program.17°
Though the government was not listed as a defendant in this case, it
intervened before Jeppesen could respond to the complaint by seeking
dismissal on the grounds of the state secrets privilege.17' Then-Director
of the CIA, General Michael Hayden, filed two declarations asserting the
privilege as "[d]isclosure of the information . . . could be expected to
cause serious-and in some instances, exceptionally grave--damage to the
national security. ' 72 The district court granted the motion as "at the core
of Plaintiffs case . . . are 'allegations' of covert U.S. military or CIA
operations in foreign countries against foreign nationals-clearly a subject
matter which is a state secret."'73 The plaintiffs appealed and the case was
reversed and remanded after a finding that the government had failed to
establish a basis for dismissal under the state secrets privilege.' 74  The
court of appeals agreed to take the case en banc to resolve "questions of
exceptional importance regarding the scope and application of the state
secrets doctrine."'7 5 In doing so, the court noted that "there is no feasible
way to litigate Jeppesen's alleged liability without creating an unjustifiable
risk of divulging state secrets . . . because the facts underlying plaintiffs'
claims are so infused with these secrets ... that the risk of disclosing them
is both apparent and inevitable."
176
The government argued that neither it not Jeppesen could be
compelled to release any
(1) information that would tend to confirm or deny whether
Jeppesen or any other private entity assisted the CIA with
clandestine intelligence activities; (2) information about whether
any foreign government cooperated with the CIA in clandestine
intelligence activities; (3) information about the scope or
170 Id. at 1076 (citing Complaint at 262-64, Mohamed v. Jeppesen Dataplan, Inc., 539 F. Supp. 2d
1128 (N.D. Cal. 2008) (No. C07-02798J)).
171 Id.
172 Id. (citation omitted).
173 Id. at 1076-77 (citation omitted).
174 Jeppmfsn Dataplan, Inc., 614 F3d at 1077.
175 Id.
176 Id. at 1087-89.
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operation of the CIA terrorist detention and interrogation
program; or (4) any other information concerning CIA
clandestine intelligence operations that would tend to reveal
intelligence activities, sources, or methods. 7'
The court seemingly agreed, stating that it could not disclose which of
these categories applied to the case at hand but that at least one was
applicable.'78 Accordingly, the earlier dismissal was affirmed pursuant to
the state secrets privilege as outlined in Reynolds.
The court's decision greatly furthered legal doctrine regarding the
applicability of the state secrets privilege, particularly in its acceptance of a
government claim when it was not a named party to the litigation. It also
granted the government authority to launch a claim at any time during
legal proceedings, even if no obligation to produce specific evidence has
yet arisen.179 Consequently, the government need not wait for an
evidentiary dispute to arise during discovery or trial before asserting the
privilege. 80 Instead the privilege may be raised with respect to discovery
requests seeking information that the government, upon its discretion,
designates as privileged,' including during responsive pleadings. 82
However, the court also limited the deference granted to government
claims of state secrets. Once the privilege has been properly invoked,
courts are instructed to make "'an independent determination whether the
information is privileged'." 83 While the earlier standard of "reasonable
danger" endures, the court also noted that "an executive decision to classify
information is insufficient to establish that the information is privileged.
Although classification may be an indication of the need for secrecy,
treating it as conclusive would trivialize the court's role."8 4 Accordingly,
a successful state secrets claim does not necessitate the dismissal of a case.
While the privileged information is completely removed from the case,
courts had a responsibility to ensure that "whenever possible, sensitive
information [is] disentangled from nonsensitive information to allow for
the release of the latter.'
185
177 ld. at 1086.
178 See id.
179 Id. at 1080.
18o Jeppesen Dataplan, Inc., 614 F.3d at 1080.
181 Id.
182 Id. at 1081.
183 Id. (cidngAl-Haramain Islamic Found., Inc. v. Bush, 507 F.3d 1190,1202).
184 Id. at 1082.
185 Id. (citing Kasza v. Browner, 133 F.3d 1159,1166 (9th Cir. 1998)).
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To further define this point, the court highlighted three distinct
circumstances when dismissal is justified: (1) when the plaintiff cannot
prove the prima facie elements of his case without the privileged
information; (2) when the defendant is denied the opportunity to launch a
valid defense, in which case the court may grant summaryjudgment in his
favor; and (3) if it is impossible to proceed because the privileged evidence
is inseparable from the non-privileged information, thus creating an
unacceptable risk of disclosing the state secrets. 6 The plaintiff must be
able to disentangle the evidence, as a successful state secrets claim means
"the evidence is absolutely privileged, irrespective of the plaintiffs'
countervailing need for it."18 7 This caused the ultimate downfall of the
plaintiffs' claims. Although they argued that certain information about
the program and Jeppesen's involvement was made public, the court still
ruled that "Jeppesen's alleged role and its attendant liability cannot be
isolated from aspects that are secret and protected.
188
What is particularly important about this case was the court's
suggestion that other remedies be made available in similar cases. While
the court acknowledged its denial of a judicial forum for the plaintiffs, it
also maintained that given the government's access to secret information,
the administration was uniquely positioned to determine whether the
plaintiffs' human rights had been violated and if so, what appropriate
remedies could be made available. 9 Similarly, the court looked to
Congress' authority to "investigate alleged wrongdoing and restrain
excesses by the executive branch," as well as to enact private bills or
remedial legislation authorizing appropriate alternative remedies for
victims.' It is here, the court asserted, that "the government's power to
remedy wrongs is ultimately reposed." 9'
186 Jeppesen Dataplan, Inc., 614 F.3d at 1083.
187 Id. at 1081.
188 Id. at 1088.
189 Id. at 1091 ("[The] government, having access to the secret information, can determine whether..
[the] claims have merit and whether misjudgments or mistakes were made that violated plaintiffs' human
rights. Should that be the case, the government may be able to find ways to remedy such alleged harm while
maintaining the secrecy [that] national security demands.").
190 Id.
191 Id. at 1092. On May 16, 2011, the Supreme Court denied the plaintiffs' petition for writ of
certiorari. Mohamed v.Jeppesen Dataplan, Inc., No. 10-778,2011 WL 1832889, at*1 (U.S. May 16,2011).
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VII. ANALYSIS
During an internal corporate meeting several years ago, Jeppesen's
Managing Director of International Trip Planning Bob Overby explained
to his coworkers that "'[w]e do all of the extraordinary rendition flights-
you know, the torture flights. Let's face it, some of these flights end up
that way'."'92 Overby was just as candid about the perks of the job, stating,
"'[i]t certainly pays well. They [the CIA] spare no expense. They have
absolutely no worry about costs. What they have to get done, they get
done'."' 93 Jeppesen's eagerness to maintain this lucrative partnership is
evident, as the company did much more than shuttle passengers between
destinations. In fact, multiple staffers were assigned solely to handle the
rendition flights, "including flight plans, clearance to fly over other
countries, hotel reservations, and ground-crew arrangements."
194
Moreover, Jeppesen's deep involvement in the extraordinary rendition
program has caused some to label the company the "CIA's travel agent." 9'
Yet in working so closely with the CIA and thereby enabling the torture of
several hundreds of victims, Jeppesen has committed an egregious
violation of its legal duties.
A. Legal Analysis
There should be no question that victims of rendition can launch a
claim against private airline companies in domestic courts. The principles
of corporate complicity impose liability upon any corporation that was
knowingly involved in the human rights abuses committed by another.
The courts must look no further than Overby's statements for
confirmation that Jeppesen's employees were well aware of the company's
role in the torture of rendition victims at an executive level. As such,
Jeppesen is liable at the highest level of corporate complicity for its
intentional and knowing participation in the commission of human rights
abuses. Direct complicity requires only that the corporation possessed
knowledge of foreseeable harmful effects of the principal offender's
actions, and Overby's comments relay an actual knowledge of the torture
that occurred. Accordingly, victims may use the principle of corporate
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complicity to impose criminal liability upon those companies that were
complicit to their torture.
Victims also have authority to launch a claim under the ATS.
Domestic courts have already determined that torture constitutes a direct
violation of the laws of nations, and expanded the reach of the ATS to
"include torts, in violation of international law, committed around the
world."'96 The scope of the ATS has not only expanded to include new
categories of torts, but also to apply to those cases of indirect liability or
those involving corporations. Consequently, the ATS provides a basis for
civil remedy to these victims.
Although victims have a solid basis for launching a claim in domestic
courts, the government's invocation of the state secrets doctrine poses a
significant challenge to their case. However, U.S. courts have misapplied
the standards of this doctrine. During the proceedings of EI-Masri, the
court acknowledged that the purpose of this doctrine is to provide a
foundation for the dismissal of cases where "the entire aim of the suit is to
prove the existence of state secrets."'97 Yet little remains unknown about
the extraordinary rendition program, as it was the topic of significant
media attention both during and after the War on Terror. The media did
much more than simply confirm the existence of the program; it also
provided explicit details about the CIA's methodology, with one reporter
even publishing actual "flight logs which document Jeppesen's
involvement in actual flight and planning."' 98 A plaintiff can thus
overcome dismissal on state secrets grounds if the court finds that "the
program is within the realm of public knowledge[,]" 99 as is the case with
the extraordinary rendition program.
This argument is only successful if the court deems the sources of
disclosure to be reliable. In making this determination, the courts have
"uniformly disregarded media reports as inherently unreliable."2" As a
result, "neither extensive reporting by the media . . . nor the detailed
allegations contained within the complaint abrogate the state secrets
privilege." 20' Currently the only sources deemed inherently reliable "are
public admissions or denials by the government or defendants to the
196 Baron Rodriguez, supra note 20, at 193.
197 EI-Masri v. Tenet, 437 F. Supp. 2d 530, 539 (E.D. Va. 2006).
198 Baron Rodriguez, supra note 20, at 200.
199 Dhooge, supra note 21, at 510.
200 Id. at 511.
201 Id.
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litigation."20 2 The existence of the rendition program has been publicly
confirmed by both President Bush 3 and his officials, and has been
"disclosed in reports prepared by other national governments and
international organizations."204 Although general statements
acknowledging the existence of the program are insufficient to overcome a
state secrets claim, that coupled with the publication of Jeppesen's flight
plans should, at the very least, allow the plaintiff to make a prima facie
showing of his case. There is certainly judicial support for making this
assertion, as a court recently concluded that the similarly situated
Terrorist Surveillance Program "no longer qualified as a state secret due to
widespread disclosures regarding its existence and operation by the federal
government."2 5 Courts might also override a state secrets claim if the
matters at hand are "beyond reasonable dispute"06 and thus no longer
constitute a secret, but they will look again to government and defendants'
admissions in making that determination.
The final factor that a court will consider is whether it is beyond
reasonable dispute that the government program could not exist without
the "'acquiescence and cooperation' of the private party named as a
defendant and seeking to preserve secrecy."20 7 In the governing case on
this matter, the court considered the scope and power of AT&T in
examining its role in the government wiretapping program. Here,
"Jeppesen dominates the international travel planning industry to an even
greater degree than AT&T dominates the telecommunications field."
208
Jeppesen exerts a global dominance, and "its services are comprehensive
and not limited to a specific field. 209 Jeppesen is clearly a global leader in
its field, and it granted the CIA access to its unrivalled capacity to
supervise and implement the rendition flights. Without Jeppesen's
202 Id.
203 In a speech on September 6,2006, President Bush stated: "[A] small number of suspected terrorist
leaders and operatives captured during the war have been held and questioned outside the United States, in a
separate program operated by the Central Intelligence Agency." President George W. Bush, Address to the
Nation (Sept. 6, 2006), available at httpV/www.nytimes.conv20A9/)6Awashingtoni06bushtranscript
html?pagewanted = all.
204 Dhooge, supra note 21, at 510.
205 Id. at 514 (citing Al-Haramain Islamic Found., Inc. v. Bush, 507 F.3d 1190, 1198-2000 (9th Cir.
2007)).
206 Heping v. AT&T Corp., 439 F. Supp. 2d 974,990-991 (C.D. Cal. 2006).
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intricate management, the extraordinary rendition program could easily
have failed.
Although the extraordinary rendition cases rarely touch upon the
political question doctrine, this principle has been cited as a foundation
for dismissal. The courts have a long history of "defer[ring] to the
executive branch with respect to national security and foreign policy
questions,"21 and have held that "limitations established by the political
questions doctrine [are] applicable to human rights claims."2 ' However,
there is also a basis for questioning the applicability of the doctrine to
cases "where the underlying action subject to challenge is private rather
than public in nature."2 2 In the 2005 case of Ibrahim v. Titan Corp.,213 the
court refused to dismiss the claims of Iraqi nationals who alleged they
were subjected to torture, cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment, and
extrajudicial killing during their time at Abu Ghraib.2" The court held
that the political question doctrine was inapplicable for two reasons: first,
because the inmates sought monetary damages and not injunctive relief,
and second, because the case was brought against a private military
contractor and not the government itself. As determined by the court,
"[a]n action for damages arising from the acts of private contractors and
not seeking injunctive relief does not involve the courts in 'overseeing the
conduct of foreign policy or the use and disposition of military power'.
21 5
Given this precedent, litigation imposing liability upon private parties,
"even those in privity of contract with the U.S. military,"216 likely avoids
dismissal under this doctrine.
Further questions can be raised regarding the applicability of the Baker
political question standards to cases of extraordinary rendition. Dhooge
argued in 2007 that theJeppesen complaint "does not merely touch upon
foreign relations; rather, it challenges a program created and implemented
by the United States in which it has been and continues to be deeply
involved." 217 Yet this point is now moot. President Obama abolished the
extraordinary rendition program in 2009. Although case-related
disclosures would certainly speak to the policies and methods of the
program as it existed, there is no reason to believe that this illicit program
210 Id. at 503.
211 Dhooge, supra note 24, at 325.
212 Id. at 329.
213 Ibrahim v. Titan Corp., 391 F. Supp. 2d 10, 12 (D.D.C. 2005).
214 Id. at 12-13.
215 Id. at 15 (citing Luffig v. McNamara, 373 F.2d 664,666 (D.C. Cir. 1967)).
216 Dhooge, supra note 24, at 329.
217 Id. at 333.
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will ever be restored. Particularly as the general War on Terror has been
called to its conclusion by the Obama administration,218 there is no
evidence suggesting that the disclosure of information speaking to the
rendition program will place the nation at any risk. There is a similar lack
of tangible evidence that the release of such information would
"undermine[] the international consensus necessary to successfully
combat the spread of global terrorism."219 Instead, one might easily
assume that foreign nations would more willingly engage in
counterterrorism efforts with the U.S. if it acknowledged past mistakes,
extended reparations to the victims, and moved forward with new and
legal procedures.
Litigating the extraordinary rendition cases is admittedly difficult, as
courts must discern the national security risk posed by information they
cannot access and plaintiffs are often unable to present outside evidence
sufficient to prove human rights violations. However, the courts have too
easily granted deference to the state secrets and political question
doctrines, when they do not necessitate the dismissal of these cases.
Jeppesen's instrumental role in the success of this program imposes
liability upon the corporation under a number of legal doctrines, and
future cases should be allowed to proceed accordingly.
B. Suggested Action
Further steps must be taken to ensure the accountability of private
airline companies participating in government-operated counterterrorism
programs. In allowing the extraordinary rendition cases to move forward,
the judicial system would provide a basis for future victims of corporate
complicity to seek reparations in domestic courts. However, the potential
success of these cases remains questionable given a series of practical
concerns, such as the collection of evidence from foreign jurisdictions and
the capacity of individual victims to overcome the massive resources of
corporations vigorously defending themselves. As a result, one option for
providing "the best chance of a successful prosecution is to enhance
218 See White House: 'War on Terrorism" is Over, WASH. TIMEs, Aug. 6, 2009, available at
http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2009/aug/06white-house-war-terrorism-
over/?feat=homeheadlines ("'The President does not describe this as a 'war on terrorism,' said John
Brennan, head of the White House homeland security office, who outlined a 'new way of seeing' the
fight against terrorism. The only terminology that Mr. Brennan said the administration is using is
that the U.S. is 'at war with al Qaeda'.").
219 Dhooge, supra note 24, at 335.
2011]
182 UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI BUSINESS LAW REVIEW [Vol. 19:147
specific provisions tailored to corporate defendants and imposing
extraterritorial liability."220  To ensure the application of consistent
standards, these new laws would impose extraterritorial criminal liability
upon U.S. corporations and those corporations with their principal place
of business in the U.S. for alleged acts of complicity. This would
particularly extend liability to a broader range of perpetrators, as
defendants are not tried as the principal offender and the theories of
complicity extend to a broad range of potential acts.
However, the tragic stories of rendition victims calls for a more
proactive approach to corporate social responsibility, one that better
prevents human rights violations in the first place. The Voluntary
Principles on Security and Human Rights [Voluntary Principles] 221 were
drafted in 2000, with the goal of guiding companies in "maintaining the
safety and security of their operations within an operating framework that
ensures respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms."
222
Although the Voluntary Principles are nonbinding, they provide
significant guidance to companies in ensuring the protection of human
rights through the course of their work. The Principles are divided into
three sections: risk assessment, interactions between companies and
public security, and interactions between companies and private security.
The final set of principles is of great relevance to counterterrorism
programs dually executed by the U.S. and private companies, as it
addresses the relationship between private security and state forces. The
first principle holds: "Private security should observe the policies of the
contracting Company regarding ethical conduct and human rights; the
law and professional standards of the country in which they operate;
emerging best practices developed by industry, civil society, and
governments; and promote the observance of international humanitarian
law."' Although these principles provide little guidance speaking to the
no Clough, supra note 40, at 926.
221 Introduction, THE VOLUNTARY PRINCIPLES ON SECURrIY AND HUMAN RIGHTS,
httpV/www.voluntaryprinciples.org(principlesfinnoducion (last visited Mar. 28,2011).
M' Id. See also Who's Involved: Participants, THE VOLUNTARY PRINCIPLES ON SECuRITY AND
HUMAN RIGHTS, http'bw.voluntayprinciples.orgparticipants/ (noting that the Principles were
established by "[tihe governments of the United States, the United Kingdom, Norway, the
Netherlands, Canada, Colombia, and Switzerland plus companies operating in the extractive and energy
sectors and non-governmental organizations, all with an interest in human rights and corporate social
responsibility.").
.3 Interactions Between Companies and Private Security, THE VOLUNTARY PRINCIPLES ON
SECURITY AND HUMAN RIGHTS, http'Avww.voluntayprinciples.orgprinciples/private security (last visited
Mar. 28,2011).
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best methods for their implementation, they provide a strong foundation
upon which an ethical business relationship between a corporation and a
state may be built. In the future, the U.S. should be required to contract
only with private companies that have signed the Voluntary Principles, or
that will sign a tailored version of the principles that are specific to the
relationship between the parties and provides for legal remedies should
the provisions be broken.
VIII. CONCLUSION
The El-Masri case has been called "a reminder of how easy it seems to
be for innocent people to be swept up into the torture gulag without
recourse of any kind."224 There can be no denying the illicitness of the
U.S.-led extraordinary rendition program, which supervised the
kidnapping and transport of suspects to CIA black sites where they were
subjected to brutal methods of physical and psychological torture, as well
as indefinite detention. Sadly, these victims have consistently been denied
access to justice in our own domestic courts.
Aside from the general legal implications of the extraordinary
rendition cases, the precedent of El-Masri andJeppesen also set a dangerous
standard for international business practices. The global media has clearly
identified Jeppesen as the private airline company that managed the
physical transport of suspects during the extraordinary rendition program.
Yet Jeppesen's role was much more engaged than the public was first led
to believe. This is a company that provided detailed logistical and
operational support for the extraordinary rendition program. This is a
company that arranged for people to be kidnapped, stripped, drugged, and
taken to a facility designed for their torture. This is a company with
employees who were sickeningly aware of their role in the torture of
several hundred victims. This is a company that not only enabled the
extraordinary rendition program, but played a critical role in its success.
Yet courts have been unwilling to hold these companies responsible
for their actions, despite legal doctrine that calls for them to do so. The
theories of corporate complicity arose from a global need and desire to
hold businesses responsible for their role in the perpetration of gross
human rights abuses. This is of particular importance today as
corporations steadily amass more money, land, and power. Still courts
choose to misapply the state secrets and political questions doctrines for
fear ofjeopardizing national security.
224 Clarke, supra note 6, at 65.
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While the protection of national security is certainly a valid concern,
nowhere do our laws explicitly allow for the phrase "national security" to
override basic human rights. The U.S. must now take active measures to
support corporate social responsibility, so that global corporations may no
longer continue their commercial assaults on human rights. Some tools
of corporate responsibility already exist, such as the Voluntary Principles;
others, such as congressional remedies to victims, have yet to be explored.
The extraordinary rendition cases reveal an urgent need to implement
greater policies of corporate liability, so that past victims might finally
knowjustice and future potential victims are never put at risk.
